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Abstract 
The Durbin Amendment is the first of the major provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act to have been implemented—but only after it withstood a 
constitutional challenge on the basis of the Takings Clause in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Now that the Amendment has 
taken effect, this Article addresses the false economic logic that led to its 
passage and the dubious arguments used to sustain its constitutionality. On 
the first issue, the supporters of the Durbin Amendment denounced the 
highly effective debit card system as a form of cartelization of the industry, 
which yields excessive returns to banks while overcharging retailers high 
rates for low-cost services. That objection rests on three central fallacies. 
The first is that the industry is monopolistic, when in fact, there is 
extensive competition for customers at every level. The second is that this 
critique ignores the economics of two-sided markets, under which transfer 
payments from retailers to customers expands the universe of debit card 
customers, spreading around the cost of operating the system. The third is 
that the costs of providing debit card services are limited to the marginal 
costs of providing services, but this critique ignores the fixed costs 
necessary to put the system in place.  
The failure to realize that these fixed costs need protection against 
government expropriation is the central error of the Eighth Circuit, which 
                                                                                                                     
 * Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service 
Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago. For the record, I represented 
TCF, the plaintiff in the litigation discussed in this Article, through the first hearing before Judge 
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falsely assumed that firms in competitive industries need less protection 
than regulated monopolies. The paradox is that this argument gets it 
exactly backwards. The justification for regulating natural monopolies is to 
imitate competitive rates to the extent possible. But that justification is 
singularly unavailable with the debit card industry, which the Eighth 
Circuit held lacked monopoly power. At this point, there is no justification 
for any rate regulation, given that the debit card companies are already at 
the competitive rate and cannot recoup all their losses—direct charges to 
their customers requires the loss of the efficiency gains that interchange 
fees are able to exploit to good effect in a two-sided economic market. 
Thus, the Durbin Amendment, because of paradoxical thinking, has 
resulted in unconstitutional regulatory takings of the debit card companies. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DURBIN PARADOX 
Congress, with great fanfare, signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 2010.1 The 
legislation contains many complex provisions that regulate major features 
of the banking and credit system in the United States. Without question, 
the two most important and controversial portions of this statute are its 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is charged with the task of 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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dealing with the “systematic risks” that large banks and other financial 
institutions are said to impose on the economy, and the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, which gives the federal government vast 
powers to regulate a wide range of credit card lending practices in the 
United States.2  
This Article, however, shall bypass these epochal developments. 
Instead, it shall focus on one lesser feature of the Act, the Durbin 
Amendment, which is found in section 1075 of the Act and regulates in a 
systematic fashion the debit card interchange fees that banks can charge 
merchants through various intermediaries,3 most notably Visa and 
MasterCard. Those provisions were recently subject to a constitutional 
challenge by TCF National Bank, which lost in both the U.S. District Court 
for the District of South Dakota4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.5 The central basis of the challenge was that the restrictive 
rate structure under the Durbin Amendment was a confiscatory taking in 
violation of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.6  
The purpose of this Article is to attack these decisions for their odd 
inversion of constitutional law, which I call the paradox of the Durbin 
Amendment. It is commonly assumed that the government has a greater 
ability to regulate firms that hold monopoly power than those which 
operate in a competitive industry.7 It is on this ground alone that the 
elaborate body of constitutional doctrine allows for some government 
regulation of natural monopolies. The basic position is that the law should 
seek to work its way between two obstacles. First, it must make sure that a 
firm that is the sole supplier in a given territory does receive monopoly 
rents. But it also must make sure that the firm’s invested capital is not 
confiscated, which is done by assuring the firm a competitive rate of return 
on its investment. What is distinctive about the Durbin Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 2. For a detailed discussion of the statute, see C. Boyden Gray & John Shu, The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2010: Is It Constitutional?, ENGAGE: J. 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS, Dec. 2010, at 66, http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20101223_Gray 
ShuEngage11.3.pdf.  
 3. Dodd-Frank Act § 1075, 124 Stat. at 2068. 
 4. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, 
at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011). For the record, I 
worked closely with TCF in the initial stages of the case through the preliminary hearing of April 4, 
2011, before Judge Lawrence L. Piersol of the South Dakota District Court. 
 5. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).  
 6. See TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1163. The relevant provision of the Fifth Amendment reads, “nor 
[shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 7. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307–16 (1989) (discussing these 
rationales); see also Michael W. McConnell, Public Utilities’ Private Rights: Paying for Failed 
Nuclear Power Projects, 12 REGULATION, no. 2, 1988 at 35, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv12n2/reg12n2-mcconnell.html.  
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decisions is that they turn this balance upside down. The courts that 
recognize the need to protect firms with monopoly power deny that 
protection to firms whose invested capital is in a competitive industry.  
In order to deal with these issues, it is necessary to set the issue in 
context. The topic here is by no means insignificant because of the rapidly 
expanding size of the debit interchange market. As Judge Lawrence L. 
Piersol wrote: 
Networks reported that debit and prepaid interchange fees 
totaled $16.2 billion in 2009. The average interchange fee for 
all debit transactions was 44 cents per transaction, or 1.14 
percent of the transaction amount. The average interchange 
fee for a signature debit transaction was 56 cents, or 1.53 
percent of the transaction amount. The average interchange 
fee for a PIN debit transaction was significantly lower than 
that of a signature debit transaction, at 23 cents per 
transaction, or 0.56 percent of the transaction amount. Prepaid 
card interchange fees were similar to those of signature debit, 
averaging 50 cents per transaction, or 1.53 percent of the 
transaction amount.8 
These revenues are not, of course, pure profit. A large fraction of them 
are needed to design, build, repair, and upgrade the basic debit card 
system—a system that has grown so rapidly in recent years that it now 
handles both more transactions and more dollars than the credit card 
system, with checks and cash occupying an ever smaller fraction of the 
overall payments market.9 The Durbin Amendment has proven such a jolt 
to the system that it has been the subject of extensive legislative 
reexamination, including a failed effort by Senators John Tester of 
Montana and Bob Corker of Tennessee to postpone the implementation of 
the Amendment for a year in order to better gauge its economic effects.10 
At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board has worked full tilt to issue 
the Amendment’s necessary implementing regulations, putting out a 
preliminary set of highly restrictive regulations on December 16, 2010,11 
                                                                                                                     
 8. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *10 (quoting Debit Card Interchange Fees and 
Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722, 81,725 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
235)). 
 9. See FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH 
PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2009 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE 
PAYMENTS STUDY], available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/press/2010_ 
payments_study.pdf. 
 10. Anisha, Tester-Corker Durbin Amendment Delay Falls Short, NERDWALLET (June 8, 
2011), http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/2011/tester-corker-durbin-amendment-delay-falls-short/. 
 11. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *8 (“On December 16, 2010, pursuant to 
subsection (a)(3), the Board issued proposed regulations, presented two alternatives as to 
interchange rates, and asked for comments as to which alternative it should adopt. In short, one 
4
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and final regulations on June 29, 2011,12 about two months after they were 
due; the rates went into force on October 1, 2011, instead of July 21, 2011, 
as had been originally planned.13 The initial set of regulations called for a 
debit interchange rate that would under no circumstances exceed twelve 
cents per transaction, a sharp decline from the forty-seven cents per 
transaction under the unregulated rate regime.14 The final regulations, 
issued after the TCF challenge was turned aside by the Eighth Circuit, 
roughly doubled the twelve-cent figure, providing that “an issuer may not 
receive or charge an interchange transaction fee in excess of the sum of a 
21-cent base component and 5 basis points of the transaction’s value (the 
ad valorem component).”15 
On April 25, 2011, Judge Lawrence L. Piersol of the District Court of 
South Dakota handed down a decision that held that TCF’s facial challenge 
to the statute was not ripe for adjudication, so no preliminary injunction 
should issue.16 That decision was affirmed, for essentially the same 
reasons, by the Eighth Circuit on June 29, 2011.17 The first point in both 
decisions was that TCF was not entitled to any protections afforded to 
public utilities, which are subject to systems of rate regulation. Judge 
Piersol put the point as follows: 
Under Minnesota Association of Health Care Facilities v. 
Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, rational basis 
review applies to this challenge because TCF’s offering of 
debit cards is not required by the government, nor is Plaintiff 
engaged in the type of “continuous production of output for 
the benefit of the public” that commentators have identified as 
the hallmark of a classic utility. Likewise, there is no 
monopoly power assumed to be associated with issuing debit 
cards. Plaintiff is not a public utility under rate case 
jurisprudence. The case law relied upon by Plaintiff is 
                                                                                                                     
proposal allowed a safe harbor of 7¢ per transaction, but no more than 12¢ if an issuer could show 
ACS costs in excess of 7¢; the alternative was a flat rate of 12¢. The Board found that current 
interchange was about 44¢ for an average-sized transaction. Thus it is clear that TCF will 
experience a revenue reduction under the proposed alternatives.”). 
 12. BD. OF GOVERNERS, FED. RESERVE SYS., DOCKET NO. R-1404, DRAFT OF FINAL RULE: 
DEBIT CARD INTERCHANGE FEES AND ROUTING 343 (June 2011) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/board 
meetings/20110629_REG_II_FR_NOTICE.FINAL_DRAFT.06_22_2011.pdf.  
 13. Id. at 37–38.  
 14. Id. at 48; see also ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR, ASSESSING RETAILERS’ COSTS AND BENEFITS 
FROM ACCEPTING DEBIT CARDS 17 (2011). 
 15. Id.  
 16. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14. 
 17. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1165 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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therefore inapplicable to its due process claim.18 
Accordingly, the level of review of government action is conducted on 
the “highly deferential” rational basis test, which requires the claimant to 
show that the government has acted in an “arbitrary and irrational way”: 
“Price control is unconstitutional if arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt.”19  
The rational basis test was also relevant to the second of the 
government’s arguments—that TCF could not show that it had a 
protectable interest, given that Visa had the “unmitigated” right to change 
its rate structure at will: 
Although TCF has an expectation regarding future debit 
interchange fees based on its contract with Visa, TCF is 
unlikely to prevail on its due process claim because Visa 
retains unmitigated discretion to set debit interchange fees and 
there is no statutory or contractual provision guaranteeing 
TCF a certain level of interchange income. Fees associated 
with payment transactions initiated by bank customers have 
also been historically subject to regulation and market 
pressures beyond TCF’s control.20 
The government’s third argument was that the system of rate regulation 
only covered the funds that TCF could receive from merchants through the 
debit card system, but did not cover the amounts that it could receive by 
charging its own customers, which amounts must be taken into account in 
order to determine whether the rates in question are confiscatory.  
Since TCF is free under the Durbin Amendment to assess 
fees on its customers to offset any losses under the Durbin 
Amendment, we are skeptical that the Durbin Amendment has 
even created a sufficient price control on TCF’s debit-card 
business so as to trigger a confiscatory-rate analysis or that the 
law could, in fact, produce a confiscatory rate.21 
Accordingly, under the stringent standards applicable to issuing 
preliminary injunctions, the case was dismissed.22 
                                                                                                                     
 18. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12–13 (citing Minn. Ass’n of Health Care 
Facilities v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984)). 
 19. TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14. 
 21. TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1164. 
 22. Both courts used the standard tests for preliminary injunctions. The appellate court stated: 
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction against a duly enacted 
statute, the district court must consider: (1) whether the movant is “likely to 
6
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The short opinions of both the district and appellate courts make it 
appear that TCF’s suit was just one more on the forlorn list of misguided 
challenges to the government’s power to set rates and control prices. 
However, virtually every statement that is treated as unquestioned truth in 
these two opinions is in fact wrong, and demonstrably so. First, by creating 
the Durbin Paradox, the two TCF decisions get matters exactly backwards 
by insisting that because there is “no monopoly power” in banks that issue 
debit cards, the government has more, rather than less, power to regulate 
these entities.23 So long as these companies have made fixed investments 
in the ground, they are entitled to the same protection against confiscatory 
rates as public utilities because they are subject to the same risk of 
government abuse. Second, the want of any firm contract with Visa is no 
more relevant to TCF’s constitutional rights than the want of every public 
utility with its own clients. In both cases, the parties to these agreements 
take business risks between themselves but do not assume the risks of 
forcible intervention with their prospective advantage by forces beyond 
their control. Third, the question is not whether the regulated banks can 
receive some additional compensation from their own customers, as they 
surely can. Rather, the question is whether TCF is entitled to an injunction 
when there is no showing that this compensation will, or even could, equal 
the position that the companies had before the statute was imposed. Unless 
the government can show that its compensation is full and complete, it 
cannot go ahead with the regulation.24 And once the structure of the 
industry is understood, it is clear that the compensation recoverable under 
the Durbin Amendment in this instance falls far short of that required 
under the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                     
prevail on the merits”; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the 
state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will 
inflict on other parties litigant; and (4) the public interest. 
TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1162 (citing and quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 
F.3d 724, 729 n.3, 733 (8th Cir. 2008), and citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 
109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)). The district court similarly noted: 
[T]he Court [must] examine first the likelihood that TCF will prevail on the merits 
of its claim that the statute is unconstitutional before the Court applies the 
remaining three factors of a preliminary injunction analysis: (1) whether Plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (2) any harm to other 
interested parties, and (3) the effect on the public interest.  
TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 729 n.3, 731 (8th Cir. 2008); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 
F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981)).  
 23. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12; TCF II, 643 F.3d at 1164–65. 
 24. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325–26 (1893) 
(defining “just compensation” in the context of government takings as “a full and perfect equivalent 
of the property taken”). 
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The development of an alternative approach to these issues requires a 
far more systematic account of these three points. First, one must give 
some account of the way in which these debit transactions were organized 
before the passage of the Durbin Amendment. Part I of this Article 
therefore seeks to determine 1) whether this organization represents an 
exercise of monopoly power (either by the debit card companies or their 
member banks, or both), or 2) whether such organization was actually an 
efficient way to handle interchange in the current network industry 
situation (that situation being one in which the requirement for 
interconnection makes it impossible to have pure competitive solutions 
because firms must cooperate in the set-up in order to compete). Part I 
concludes that the second efficiency explanation is correct and that the 
attempt to find subtle influences of monopoly power on debit transaction 
organization is not credible.  
Part II examines the provisions of the Durbin Amendment, which were 
explicitly justified—both by Senator Dick Durbin and the merchants who 
supported them—by the view that the monopoly account of debit card 
markets was correct. Part II explores the various mechanisms used to 
regulate banks and the exemptions that are afforded under the Amendment 
for small banks, defined as those that have less than $10 billion in bank 
assets.25 That group of smaller banks covers all but sixty banks and three 
credit unions in the United States, out of about 7,000 banks and 7,000 
credit unions total. Those larger institutions, however, hold the vast 
majority of total bank assets.26 
Part III then uses the information in Parts I and II to conduct a 
constitutional inquiry, which will necessarily face far higher hurdles if the 
antimonopoly rationale for the Amendment holds than it will if the 
efficiency explanation offered by the industry’s defenders, and this Article, 
is correct. Accordingly, under the current tests for rate regulation, this 
Article argues that in principle—no matter what the regulated rates set by 
the Federal Reserve—the Durbin Act is unconstitutional.  
I.  THE ECONOMICS OF DEBIT CARD TRANSACTION 
The Durbin Amendment regulates debit card interchange fees27—the 
fees that merchants, through “acquiring,” pay for processing debit 
transactions through Visa and MasterCard, which then remit some fraction 
of these payments to the banks that issued debit cards to their own 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 723(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1680 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 26. A Repository of Financial Data and Institution Characteristics Collected by the Federal 
Reserve System, NATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpub 
web/nicweb/top50form.aspx. 
 27. See Dodd-Frank Act sec. 1075, § 920(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2068. 
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customers.28 Before the Durbin Amendment, interchange fees for debit 
card use were set by the coordination of the activities of the five central 
players in the system: the cardholder, the bank that issued the card to that 
person, the network platform, the merchant bank, and the merchant.29 At 
the center of the system sits the credit card company, which operates at the 
nexus between the customer and the merchant. The two most essential 
parties in this system are Visa and MasterCard, which have a combined 
share of about 83% of debit card transactions, with Visa having a 66% 
market share and MasterCard having the remaining 17%.30 Other smaller 
operations control the rest of the business; however, debit cards occupy 
only part of the payments system, which includes an ever broadening set of 
payment methods—PayPal, mobile phone payments, prepaid cards, and the 
like.31 
On one side of this payment platform are the customers who acquire 
their debit or credit cards from a bank. There is a direct contract between 
the customer and the bank, and that contract may include a variety of fees 
that the customer has to pay the bank for services, including charges for 
defaulting on payment obligations. As the market was organized prior to 
the passage of the Durbin Amendment, retail customers did not pay any 
interchange fees for the use of their debit cards, which they received for 
free. On the other side of the interchange platform is the retailer, who 
usually works though a merchant bank to secure connections to the 
platform operator, and through that platform operator to the customer and 
the customer’s bank. The retailers and their merchant banks negotiate a 
contract for the services that the bank renders to the retailer, the cost of 
which will vary with the level of services that the retailer furnishes to itself 
and those furnished by the bank.  
A representative set of numbers reads as follows, starting with a $100 
debit transaction by a consumer. On a $100 transaction, the merchant 
receives back approximately $97.20. The issuing bank retains roughly 
$1.70 and around $0.50 is retained by the merchant or acquiring bank for 
the debit card company.32 
The organization of this network takes place without any direct 
negotiations between the merchants on the one side of the platform and the 
issuing banks on the other. Rather, the rates between Visa and MasterCard 
and the various merchants are indeed negotiated rates, which depend on the 
quality of the debit card information and the volume of services that the 
                                                                                                                     
 28. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 60–61.  
 29. See id. at 356 n.199. 
 30. STEVEN C. SALOP ET AL., MERCHS. PAYMENTS COAL., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEBIT CARD 
REGULATION UNDER SECTION 920 10 (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/files/merchants_payment_coalition_meeting_20101102.pdf. 
 31. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 124. 
 32. See generally LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14. 
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merchant supplies to the platform operator. These rates are typically below 
1% for large retailers like Wal-Mart, and are far more expensive (even five 
or six times as high) for smaller retailers that present greater operational 
challenges and default risks to the banks.33 On the other side, Visa and 
MasterCard negotiate standard fees with issuing banks, which fees 
represent what the banks are paid for the services they rendered to 
merchants and customers. In addition, the platform operator takes its own 
small cut on each transaction. In essence, once a merchant bill is presented 
to the issuing bank, that bank takes the appropriate sums out of the debit 
card holder accounts, keeps its own fee, and passes on the remainder of the 
money, first to the platform operator (which takes its own slice) and then to 
the acquiring or merchant bank.34 
The distinctive feature of this system is the interchange fee that goes 
over the network from merchant to customer. The key question asks what 
function these fees serve. Here, the simplest explanation for the current fee 
structure is that it allows the issuing banks and Visa and MasterCard to 
provide several services of value to the merchants. To be sure, merchant 
groups often claim that these debit card transactions are just the equivalent 
of checks,35 which generally clear “at par,” meaning that the person to 
whom a check is made out receives the face value of the check. But one 
reason that debit transactions do not clear at par is that, in fact, they serve 
important additional functions, summarized by Anne Layne-Farrar, a TCF 
consultant, as follows: 
Thus far in the debate over the Durbin Amendment, to the 
best of my knowledge, retailers have focused solely on bank 
card transaction fees and have not acknowledged that cards 
may provide benefits that offset those bank fees. For instance, 
card payments can often be processed faster than cash, and are 
certainly faster than a check, which means retailers save labor 
time at the checkout station, save consumers time for their 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., VISA, VISA U.S.A. INTERCHANGE REIMBURSEMENT FEES (2011), available at 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-usa-interchange-reimbursement-fees-october2011.pdf. 
 34. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment, REG.: 
CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T, Spring 2011, at 24, 26–27, for further description. 
 35. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the Retail Litigation Center, Inc. in Support of 
Appellees and Affirmance of the District Court Order at 4, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805), 2011 WL 2003118 [hereinafter RLC Brief] (“Debit 
cards, like checks, are merely an access device to consumers’ asset accounts, usually a checking or 
demand deposit account (DDA). TCF admits as much: ‘Today, one cannot separate out the debit 
service from a checking account.’ TCF even refers to its debit cards as ‘check cards,’ as did Visa 
when it first marketed debit cards.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Amended Complaint at para. 48, 
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 
25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011), and News Release, TCF Bank, TCF Bank 
Announces Checking Product Enhancements and Introduces Mobile Banking (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://ir.tcfexpress.com/phoenix. zhtml?c=95289&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1513371&highlight=)). 
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own checkout as well as in line behind others. In addition, 
debit cards do not involve cash in the till and thus lower 
retailers’ risk of employee theft or break in. Unlike checks, 
debit cards provide merchants (following the prescribed steps) 
with guaranteed payment. Moreover, debit cards can offer 
retailers direct benefits, such as increased incremental 
customer spending. 36  
It is worth explaining her conclusions in a bit more detail. The check is 
a “dumb” piece of paper that does not integrate easily with merchant 
computer systems and thus does not supply merchants with instant 
information of value in their own business. Use only a check, and it will 
not add anything to the merchant’s knowledge of the financial position of 
the customer. The check, moreover, offers a slower form of payment, 
which reduces the flow of customers through checkout lines, which in turn 
increases the cost of processing these transactions. Even though check-
imaging systems today make it unnecessary to ship checks back and forth 
across the country, those record-keeping devices do not allow for 
instantaneous examination of bank balances and credit histories while the 
customer is waiting in the checkout line. The risk of bad checks, moreover, 
remains with the retailer because the bank at the time and place of service 
has no direct means to determine whether the customer has sufficient funds 
to cover that transaction in his demand deposit account, formerly known as 
a checking account. (The new name reflects that the payments from this 
account are usually not made by checks, whose use, both by number and by 
dollar amount, has decreased sharply in recent years.)37 
In dealing with this issue, it is critical to note that there is always a risk 
component with respect to debit card payments because it often makes 
good business sense for banks to allow customers to overdraw their 
accounts at the end of the month if they are confident that the next 
paycheck will cover the expenditure. The algorithms used to make these 
judgments are not perfect, such that putting the risk of loss on the bank for 
the debit payments it has authorized offers an effective bonding device for 
the reliability of the system. As with all warranties, the outsider does not 
need to understand how its trading partner works, so long as it receives a 
full warranty against its losses. This warranty is relatively easy to arrange 
for liquidated sums, against which a premium can provide adequate 
insurance; this is what happens whenever merchants electronically make 
contact with the bank, which immediately authorizes the payment, then 
clears and settles the transaction. The superior information available to the 
bank thus makes it rational for it to assume the risk of default—a risk that 
                                                                                                                     
 36. LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14, at 3. Layne-Farrar’s report provides a detailed discussion 
of, with an effort to quantify, net benefits. See generally id. 
 37. See 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
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is one of the elements of expense covered by interchange fees that 
merchants pay to issuing banks. Yet these residual risks can still be high: 
as the Federal Reserve notes, “comparable service for checks costs 
merchants 1.5 percent of the transaction value,”38 a figure which is 
somewhat reduced for debit card transactions, with their superior 
monitoring. 
In addition, the convenience of debit cards means that individual 
customers carry less cash; there is corresponding evidence of “ticket lift,” 
which means that customers tend to make larger purchases on debit cards 
than they do with cash, ranging from 5% to 20% of the purchase price. 
Visa and MasterCard also both promote their own brands, which brings 
more customers into the system, and the banks promote their own 
individual cards, which brings more customers to each merchant—another 
benefit of the cards.39 
In assessing the uses of debit cards, these benefits to the merchant must 
be offset against its interchange fee. As a matter of basic economic theory, 
it is obvious that both customers and merchants benefit from this high 
volume of debit transactions. Nonetheless, that position is frequently urged 
by merchants40 who purport to identify a market failure on the customer 
side because they do not have an explicit breakdown of debit interchange 
fees, which if known would lead to major protests. This information is 
publicly available,41 but in most cases, the rational customer’s first order of 
business is to compare the value of the goods and services received against 
the amount charged for them. Once the value received is greater than the 
cost, there is no more reason to inquire into the amount that goes to debit 
interchange than there is to ask what fraction of the sale price goes to 
overhead, service, and the cost of goods. None of that information will 
alter the basic decision point. To be sure, consumers would love to have 
lower prices, but they do not need full disclosure to push them down that 
favorable path. Let any firm raise prices so that they do not reflect 
underlying costs, and other firms with lower costs will fill the void. No 
consumer knows the cost of each component of a new computer, but 
competition for overall sales drives the price of the equipment down to the 
cost of production, as in other markets. It is not credible to find any form 
of market failure, let alone fraud or deception, in the failure to disclose 
information that no one wants. 
Nor is the ultimate analysis different when we look at the other side of 
the market. It strains credulity to think that the likes of McDonald’s resorts 
                                                                                                                     
 38. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 54.  
 39. LAYNE-FARRAR, supra note 14, at 11–14. 
 40. Credit Card Interchange Fees: Hearing Before  the Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Antitrust 
Task Force), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ printers/110th/36785.pdf. 
 41. See, e.g., 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY, supra note 9. 
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to debit cards in desperation even though it loses money on the transaction 
relative to other payment forms. Rather, the continued use of these cards in 
all segments of the economy, including quick service restaurants, is 
powerful evidence to the contrary.42 The theory of revealed preferences is 
too clear. As Kevin M. Murphy, a TCF expert, wrote: “It is highly unusual, 
indeed perhaps unprecedented, to focus regulatory scrutiny and 
intervention on a segment of the economy that all participants have 
voluntarily and enthusiastically embraced, and that has grown faster than 
and substantially displaced competing products or services.”43 
Yet that inference is passionately resisted by the retailers who claim 
that “[b]ecause the RLC’s members must accept debit cards to remain 
competitive, they have had no choice but to pay these fees.”44 The point is 
absurd on its face. If these transactions cost more than they are worth, all 
retailers should regain the high ground by spurning debit cards and offering 
lower prices to customers, who should happily be willing to pay with cash 
or check. But of course, the reason that they do not is that the implicit costs 
to consumers (in terms of their time and cost) is higher with cash and 
check, so consumers prefer the same mechanism that is cheaper for the 
retailers using these services. There has been extensive debate in the 
literature as to which form of payment subsidizes which other forms of 
payment, but that debate is ultimately futile.45 Murphy has rightly noted 
that some form of cross-subsidy is ubiquitous in all retail markets, if only 
because some customers rely more on the help of sales staff than others.46 
In general, it is difficult to charge separately for these services, so these 
imbalances are handled in more subtle ways, like walking away from 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 15–19. 
 43. Report of Professor Kevin M. Murphy at 3, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45059 (D.S.D. Feb. 15, 2011) (No. CIV 10-4149), 2011 WL 863916 [hereinafter Murphy 
Report]. 
 44. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 1.  
 45. For a demolition of the cross-subsidy claim with respect to gasoline purchases, see Steven 
Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Tax the 
Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (2009), which concluded:  
Although the best available evidence indicates that merchants pay more out-of-
pocket to accept credit cards than they do for other forms of payment, these costs 
are only half the story. Credit cards provide significant benefits to merchants that 
could outweigh the incrementally higher out-of-pocket costs and thus lead to 
lower retail prices. Although the evidence is inconclusive, credit card acceptance 
appears to make all consumers better off than they would be if the particular 
merchants with whom they deal did not accept cards.  
Id. at 421–22 (footnote omitted). The same observations can be made about debit cards.  
For an analytical demolition of the point, see Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 30–31, noting 
that any analysis that looks only at some costs and benefits, while ignoring all others is “completely 
one sided.” 
 46. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 31–32.  
13
Epstein: The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolie
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1320 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
customers who take up too much time.  
The real question is whether these retail institutions can tolerate 
systematic cross-subsidies that do, in fact, create distortions among 
customer classes. Where these show up in substantial form, a merchant has 
an incentive to introduce differential pricing, if that could be implemented 
at a low enough cost. If debit cards were subsidized by cash and check 
customers, we should see merchants move to eliminate the subsidies in 
order to increase their customer base. Yet the reverse is actually true. We 
also know that all cross-subsidies are necessarily eliminated if debit and 
credit cards drive out cash and checks; this is the case with some airlines 
that will take only plastic for onboard transactions. More generally, the 
relative decline in the use of cash and checks makes it very hard to say that 
a smaller fraction of payment transactions subsidize the rest, when it could 
easily go in the opposite direction. The proper mix of payment systems for 
any given firm is difficult to predict in the abstract. Some small outfits take 
only cash, while others refuse to take cash or checks. Some accept multiple 
forms of payment, but may steer customers to one form of payment relative 
to another. These differences do not, however, supply evidence of some 
pervasive form of market failure. They show only that “different strokes 
for different folks” is appropriate for payment systems, as it is for just 
about every other feature of doing business.  
It is, therefore, simply not tenable to accept the merchant contention 
that huge businesses use operations on which they lose money, when other 
options are available to them. Nonetheless, the rapid expansion of the debit 
card industry could still be consistent with the view that monopolization on 
the other side of the industry has made the use of debit (and credit) cards 
more expensive for merchants than would have been the case in a pure 
competitive market. In fact, much of the criticism against the debit card 
structure is that it in fact does facilitate monopoly practices. Once again, 
the RLC brief shows how the argument is made in a judicial setting: 
“[N]etworks like Visa fix the price of interchange for TCF and its rival 
issuing banks, and then [use] their market power [to force] merchants to 
accept debit cards with . . . anticompetitively high interchange fees.”47 
These remarks are consistent with the same charges that have been levied 
against the debit card companies and the banks in Congressional testimony. 
Mallory Duncan, the General Counsel of the NRF, states that charge 
baldly: “Visa and MasterCard . . . are cartels whose members set the fees 
they will charge and all agree to charge the same fees.”48 Indeed, as the 
government notes in its brief, both banks and merchants have a similar 
                                                                                                                     
 47. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 13. 
 48. Credit Card Interchange Fees: Hearing Before the Antitrust Task Force of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 54 (2007) (statement of Mallory Duncan, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel, National Retail Federation), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
printers/110th/36785.PDF.  
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/1
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 1321 
 
relationship to the credit card companies. Thus, in speaking of TCF, it 
observes that “[n]othing in plaintiff’s contract with Visa guarantees any 
minimum interchange fee or even limits the circumstances in which Visa 
can reduce the fee schedule,”49 which, while true, hardly shows that credit 
card companies and banks are in cahoots.  
What is clearly lacking in these broad denunciations is a coherent 
account of some antitrust violation. For starters, if there were indeed 
cartels that operated in violation of the antitrust laws, the merchants would 
not need to apply to Congress for any special relief under the Durbin 
Amendment. Instead, they could simply file a complaint under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, taking advantage of what is essentially a per se rule 
with respect to cartel behavior and obtaining treble damages and perhaps 
some form of injunctive relief.50 Yet to this point, no merchant has 
attempted to file a suit of that sort. Indeed, the successful antitrust actions 
(the merits of which could be disputed) take exactly the opposite form. 
They seek to attack particular practices that each of these networks have 
undertaken unilaterally to show that they create, for example, some type of 
illegal tie-in arrangement.51 
At this juncture, it is necessary to inquire how the cartel theory applies 
to Visa and MasterCard when they try to organize their vertical 
relationships with their own customers. It is agreed on all sides that there is 
no coordinated effort by the banks to set interchange rates. Indeed, as the 
RLC notes in connection with TCF, the evidence is unambiguous that it 
and all other Visa banks are rate-takers rather than rate-makers. As RLC 
states, “Debit networks fix the price of interchange for rival issuers, and 
can change it at will,”52 and furthermore these debit “[n]etworks have used 
market power to force merchants to accept these high interchange fees that 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Brief for Appellees at 16, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 
2011) (No. 11-1805) [hereinafter Brief for Government]. 
 50. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006). 
 51. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07, 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied sub nom. Leonardo’s Pizza by the Slice, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 544 U.S. 
1044 (2005). The stated value of the settlement was $2 billion against Visa and $1 billion against 
MasterCard, but those figures do not correct for discounting. The actual practice attacked in those 
cases was the decision to tie the use of signature debit to PIN debit at various retail outlets. Id. at 
507–08. In general the direct costs of PIN debit are lower than those of signature debit, but there is 
a large level of consumer resistance to PIN debit (especially since the theft of PIN numbers could 
result in fraud when the card is used elsewhere). In fact, only a handful of establishments have taken 
advantage of the option to break the tie, given the division of consumer sentiment on the issue. It 
seems incredulous for the RLF to claim that settlement contained “injunctive relief ‘result[ing] in 
future savings to the Class valued from approximately $25 to $87 billion or more.’” RLC Brief, 
supra note 35, at 14 n.39 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Visa Check, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 511–
12). 
 52. RLC Brief, supra note 35, at 7. 
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are unrelated to costs.”53 The critics of the industry take the point one step 
further when they note that the contracts Visa uses do not confer any strong 
rights on their member banks, given that Visa can simply change the 
rates.54  
The question is how best to read this information. One way is to say 
that Visa takes it upon itself to create a cartel for the various banks it seeks 
to attract as customers. Yet one must pause to ask whether there could be 
any efficiency justification for the practice that would block the application 
of a per se denunciation. In this context, there clearly is, given the central 
role that both Visa and MasterCard play in the organization of a network 
industry. To see why this is the case, just assume for the moment that Visa 
and MasterCard did not exert any influence to standardize prices. At that 
point, just how would these debit interchange fees be determined? The 
answer is only at a far higher transaction cost. The point here bears directly 
on the question of antitrust liability because it is always a fair question to 
ask whether some supposed risk of monopolization presents a greater peril 
to market operation than the risk of a system paralysis brought on because 
the transaction costs are so high that they exceed the joint gain for all 
parties. In a world in which there are upwards of 5,000,000 retailers and 
7,000 banks,55 one-on-one negotiations are a dead loser for all parties. 
Hence, the intermediary sets the rates on both ends, passing on the savings 
to both parties and to the consumers who operate on both sides of the 
market. 
The key question therefore becomes this: just how are these rates set? 
To answer this question, the retailers hired Professor Steven Salop of the 
Georgetown University Law Center, who urged that all debit interchange 
fees be abolished, so that these transactions, like checks, cleared at par. He 
noted that the Canadian interchange system was set up this way from the 
outset and that it could be a viable model for dealing with the exchange 
problem in the United States.56 His reason for wanting this system is that 
he feared that the dynamics of these markets were such that Visa and 
MasterCard would find it in their interest to push rates to the banks as high 
as they could in order to attract their customers. Professor Salop 
concluded: 
The fact that Visa and MasterCard have market power 
over merchants, but compete for issuers, implies that they 
have strong incentives to exploit their market power over 
merchants in order to subsidize issuers. This dynamic has 
                                                                                                                     
 53. Id. at 9. 
 54. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010), 
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulations-
core.pdf. 
 55. See In re Visa Check, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 522–24. 
 56. SALOP ET AL., supra note 30, at 24–26. 
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resulted in high interchange fees that are paid by merchants 
and received by issuers.57 
Yet this statement, repeated many times in the study, conceals more 
than it raises. The initial question is why it is that Visa and MasterCard 
have market power only over the merchants and not over the banks. That 
position possibly made some sense when Visa and MasterCard were each 
run by a coalition of large banks, even as they supplied their services to a 
larger banking community. But it was precisely to avoid the antitrust risk 
associated with this behavior that MasterCard converted itself into an 
independent entity in 2007, and Visa followed in 2008. The rates charged 
in these cases did not change much with this reorganization. The reason 
why one profit-making entity should shower goods on another is not fully 
explained. 
The second point is that it is hard to understand what the equilibrium 
price is under this model. Each time the interchange rates are raised with 
respect to the merchants by, say, Visa, it presents a profit opportunity for 
MasterCard to keep or even trim its rates, in order to persuade merchants to 
steer their customers in their direction. It would be devastating for either 
Visa or MasterCard to find that some large establishments would refuse to 
take its purchasers, especially when many customers carry both types of 
cards. Indeed, it is for that reason that the two companies compete up and 
down the market. The entire market is not as stable as the market shares 
suggest, for if either Visa, MasterCard, or both raised their rates, the fringe 
players could start to compete for a larger share of the marketplace under 
the price umbrella these firms create. The assertion of monopoly power 
that comes from the true claim that the merchants would very much like to 
take all cards may nudge rates above the competitive level, but if so, it is 
not clear by how much. Nor is it possible to think of any pricing pairing 
mechanism that would not be worse than the condition that it is intended to 
cure. 
In making these claims about the peculiar structure of the market, 
Salop notes, correctly, that the distinctive feature of debit card markets is 
that they are two-sided markets.58 A two-sided market is not one in which 
there are just buyers and sellers, of course; by that definition, all markets 
would be two-sided. Rather, the term applies to markets in which there are 
least three parties to the transaction, where the middle party (here, Visa and 
MasterCard) is there to make sure that the two opposing sides are willing 
to do business with each other. Kevin Murphy, in his written testimony on 
behalf of TCF, notes that in a two-sided market, the ability to attract 
customers on one side of the market depends on the ability to attract those 
customers to the other side of the market. The most obvious illustrations of 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 1–2. 
 58. See SALOP ET AL., supra note 30, at 12–13. 
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this are dating services, which try to attract the right proportion of men and 
women, and dining services, such as Groupon, which must match 
restaurants with customers. The point is that someone has to pay the fees to 
operate the matching services, and in these markets, the fees are not 
typically borne equally by both sides of the market, but rather are paid from 
one side of the market. With dating services, therefore, men pay higher 
rates in order to attract the relative paucity of women, and with food 
services, the payments come from the restaurants, which are anxious to fill 
empty tables. In all of these situations, the payment systems, in effect, 
introduce a conscious cross-subsidy across the two sides of the market so 
that the parties on the less elastic (that is, price-sensitive) side of the 
market pay some money over to the other side in order to keep the market 
alive.59 
The key mistake in Salop’s argument is that at no point does he address 
the potential efficiency gains that arise from these cross-market payments 
in two-sided markets—even when, as with restaurants and bars, none of 
the participants to the organization contain any element of monopoly 
power. Yet the theoretical foundation for this position is well laid out in 
the late Professor William F. Baxter’s classic article on the question.60 The 
clear implication of Professor Baxter’s article is that, wholly apart from 
monopoly exploitation, there is a strong efficiency explanation as to why 
payments across network platforms improve the operation of the overall 
system. This explanation is cumulative with the transaction cost 
explanation given above, insofar as it offers an additional reason why the 
markets here converge to a competitive equilibrium. Whether this is 
perfect convergence is impossible to say, but there is nonetheless a good 
reason to think that the Murphy Report assesses the situation correctly 
when it concludes, “[P]roponents of debit regulation have not identified 
any market failure that justifies intervention, because there are none.”61 It 
is rare to find any industry that is perfectly competitive and it is always 
possible to postulate that any shortfall in information or transparency 
counts as a market failure. But even if the Murphy conclusion goes a bit 
too far, it is clear that the explosive growth and widespread acceptance of 
debit cards exhibit the signs of a vibrant, highly competitive industry, not 
one that is in need of a comprehensive overhaul. There is no cartel in 
operation and no natural monopoly—a point that becomes critical later on 
in the constitutional analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 11–12, 15–17, 26 n.80. 
 60. William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic 
Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 541–43 (1983). 
 61. Murphy Report, supra note 43, at 2. 
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II.  THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
The subject of debit interchange received extensive general discussion 
before the passage of the Durbin Amendment. Thus, there were many 
studies of the topic by the various banks in the Federal Reserve System, 
hearings on the topic before various committees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and U.S. Senate, and a large academic literature devoted to 
various aspects of the topic. In that large body of material, not a single 
syllable can be located addressing the highly specific proposal that was 
incorporated into Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  
Senator Durbin introduced the eponymous Durbin Amendment late 
amid the extensive deliberations over the Dodd-Frank legislation.62 During 
his well-known floor speech on the Amendment, he repeated many of the 
arguments examined above, to the effect that his legislation was needed to 
help small businesses escape the dominant market position of the banks, so 
that these businesses could take the money that they spend on debit 
interchange and devote it to lowering prices and creating jobs.63 In 
particular, the Senator relied on the private statements of the head of a 
major corporation (subsequently identified as Greg Wasson, the CEO of 
Walgreens64) that interchange fees were too high because they were the 
fourth largest item on the corporation’s books, after salaries, plant, and 
health care.65 During the course of the floor debate, the Senator constantly 
stressed that the costs of running a debit card system were only a small 
fraction of the debit interchange fees.66 
The legislation that Senator Durbin pushed was adopted in response to 
these elements. The Amendment did not take Professor Salop’s position 
eliminating all interchange fees, but it did instruct the Federal Reserve to 
“consider the functional similarity” to “checking transactions that are 
required within the Federal Reserve bank system to clear at par.”67 
Immediately preceding this instruction, the Amendment prescribed that 
interchange fees had to be “reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 156 CONG. REC. S3624–25 (daily ed. May 12, 2010); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3040–41 
(daily ed. May 3, 2010). 
 63. 156 CONG. REC. S3129–30 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 
see also 156 CONG. REC. S3696–97 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 64. See 156 CONG. REC. S3455 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin) 
(relating conversation with “the CEO of Walgreens”); Gregory D. Wasson, WALGREENS, 
http://news.walgreens.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1099 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 65. 156 CONG. REC. 3130 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 66. See 156 CONG. REC. S3695–96 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard 
Durbin); 156 CONG. REC. S3588–89 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 
156 CONG. REC. S3455–56 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); 156 
CONG. REC. S3130 (daily ed. May 5, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). 
 67. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(4)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 2068 (2010) (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(A) (West 2010)). 
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by the issuer with respect to the transaction.”68 The terms “reasonable” and 
“proportional” were not to be read in isolation, but in turn received their 
own statutory definitions, which provided that, in issuing its regulation, the 
Federal Reserve must differentiate between: 
(i) the incremental cost incurred by an issuer for the role 
of the issuer in the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a 
particular electronic debit transaction . . . ; and (ii) other costs 
incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a particular 
electronic debit transaction . . . .69  
The implicit subtext of these provisions is that the banks can recoup the 
revenues they lose in debit interchange from their own customers, in the 
terms of higher rates for the various services they supply. 
Left as a general provision, the Durbin Amendment lacked sufficient 
votes in the Senate, until Senator Durbin agreed to allow a small-bank 
exemption from the interchange fees. In his original draft, “small” banks 
included only banks that had assets of less than a billion dollars.70 When 
the bill came up short, he substituted this for ten billion, after which the 
bill passed.71 Add a zero and the job was done. Yet at no point in these 
frantic machinations did anyone make any effort to discuss the impact that 
the major changes in debit interchange would have on the long-term 
stability of the system, or the impact that the exemption of the small banks 
would have on the balance of advantage over debit card accounts. TCF 
chose to sue because, at $18 billion, it was too large to count as a small 
bank. Yet it was also heavily invested in its debit card business, which was 
in direct competition with smaller banks that were nearby all of TCF’s 
locations.72 At the same time, TCF had no credit card business to which it 
could shift its customers, as earlier efforts to reach that market failed in 
light of TCF’s position as a retail bank serving many middle- and low-
income customers, with high turnover and default rates.73 It is worth noting 
that the class of banks considered “large” under the Amendment is quite 
broad, as the three largest banks in the United States, which run highly 
diversified operations, are Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 2068 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1693o-2(a)(2)). 
 69. Id. § 920(a)(4)(B)(i)–(ii), 124 Stat. at 2068–69 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-
2(a)(4)(B)). 
 70. 156 CONG. REC. S3040-41 (daily ed. May 3, 2010). 
 71.  Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 1075, § 920(a)(6)(A), 124 Stat. at 2070 (to be codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A)). 
 72. Brief of Appellant TCF National Bank at 9–10, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805). 
 73. Amended Complaint at 10, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059 
(D.S.D. 2011) (No. CIV 10-4149). 
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Citibank, all with assets at or over $2 trillion dollars,74 and all of which are 
more than a hundred times TCF’s size. These differences illustrate that a 
statute like the Durbin Amendment could easily have a vastly differential 
effect on the various parties whom it governs. 
The Durbin Amendment took effect on October 1, 2011.75 In the days 
leading up to its implementation different banks announced that they 
would put different kinds of fees on debit card use, most notably the $5 per 
month fee that Bank of America thought was needed to restore its financial 
position, which is already subject to severe attack. There is also ample 
evidence that many banks will pull back on various services in order to rein 
in costs, knowing that under the current rate structure they are expected to 
lose about $6.6 billion a year in debit card fees.76 Yet, although much is 
now known, there remains much uncertainty as to how deeply it will cut 
into the operation of the debit markets and as to how important the small 
bank exemption will prove in influencing customers to move. The most 
notable development is that, in its long final report, the Federal Reserve 
gave an expansive reading to the allowable costs, which did not limit these 
only to the costs of authorizing, clearing, and settling individual 
transactions. Instead, the Federal Reserve adopted a far broader rule, noting 
that “[i]n establishing the standard, the Board included all types of costs 
incurred by the issuer to effect an electronic debit transaction for which 
reliable data were available to the Board through its survey or through 
comments.”77  
The point of this Article is not to examine whether this broad reading is 
correct, although it is not. Rather, it is to deal with the constitutional issues 
of the statute, on the assumption that the rules adopted by the Federal 
Reserve should be treated as though they were explicitly inserted into the 
statute. With these understandings in place, Part III will now address the 
constitutional challenges to the Durbin Amendment. I stress at the outset 
that these are my own views and do not necessarily represent the position 
of TCF National Bank or indeed any of the many parties who have such a 
deep interest in the litigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 74. Top 50 Bank Holding Companies Summary Page, NAT’L INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/nichome.aspx (last updated Sept. 30, 2011). 
 75. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 37.  
 76. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard & Ben Protess, Banks to Make Customers Pay Fee for 
Using Debit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A1. 
 77. FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 12, at 74 (emphasis added). 
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III.  CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIMS AND THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 
A.  The Case for Strict Scrutiny 
Both opinions in the TCF litigation opted for the rational basis test,78 as 
if it were the only possible standard that could apply to the case. In so 
doing, neither the Eighth Circuit nor the district court cited or discussed the 
rate regulation cases governing public utilities, even though these cases 
were prominently featured in TCF’s briefs.79 Instead, both opinions 
immediately adopted the due process test that is used in many price control 
settings, including those schemes used for dairy products80 and rent 
control.81 
It is a common understanding among constitutional scholars that the 
outcome of a particular constitutional challenge depends heavily on the 
standard of review that is brought to a case. In approaching this question, 
current law has articulated three standards of review that, with many 
gradations, dominate constitutional law: (a) strict scrutiny of the statute or 
regulation, (b) intermediate scrutiny, and (c) rational basis review, which 
allows the legislature great deference.  
The best way to understand the difference among these tests is to ask 
which errors of what magnitude the court is prepared to tolerate in the 
administration of the law. Under a strict scrutiny regime, the law attaches 
great weight to the constitutional claim and therefore tolerates only a low 
rate of error before invalidating the law. At the opposite extreme, the errors 
necessary to warrant invalidation under rational basis review are thought to 
be quite high. It is therefore the case that in all disputes, a more favorable 
standard of review for the challenger can increase by an order of magnitude 
the likelihood that a constitutional challenge will be successful.  
On this issue, it is important to note the four-part classification in the 
current takings and economic liberties literature that frames the debate. At 
one extreme lie the rules dealing with the physical occupation of property, 
for which there is a virtually per se obligation on the part of the 
government to compensate, no matter for what purpose the property is 
used.82 At the other extreme, most especially in land use cases, the standard 
of review is set by the critical Supreme Court decision in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,83 which self-consciously 
                                                                                                                     
 78. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, 
at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011); TCF Nat’l Bank v. 
Bernanke (TCF II), 643 F.3d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).  
 79. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 20–45, TCF I, 643 F.3d 1158 (No. 11-1805); Reply Brief 
for Appellant at 6–13, TCF I, 643 F.3d 1158 (No. 11-1805). 
 80. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1933). 
 81. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1921). 
 82. Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).  
 83. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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established a far more deferential standard for regulatory takings, that is, 
those takings that limit the use and disposition of particular property 
without any dispossession of the tenant. The case’s key passage reads:  
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole,” this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop 
any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” 
require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. . . . 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, 
the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have 
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is 
the character of the governmental action. A “taking” may 
more readily be found when the interference with property 
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, 
than when interference arises from some public program 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.84 
In using that test, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concluded that New 
York City’s Landmark Preservation Council was within its rights when it 
blocked Penn Central’s plan to build a tower over Grand Central Station: 
so long as Penn Central was able to cover the costs of its existing 
operations, no taking had occurred. For these purposes, it was irrelevant 
that air rights were, as a matter of state law, separable property interests 
that could be sold or mortgaged in standard market transactions.85 The key 
point is that this is a land use case, in which the Court expressed a good 
deal of concern about how the construction of this tower would influence 
views from various locations, as well as the character of the neighborhood. 
These were matters to take into account in this instance, as in dealing with 
general zoning laws, where the same level of discretion was allowed.86 In 
this case, where multiple externalities were at stake, the level of judicial 
scrutiny was low. The land use cases fall into this category. 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 124 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), and citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
 85. Id. at 136–38. 
 86. Id. at 125 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 
U.S. 603, 608 (1909); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)). 
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The third relevant class of cases deals with general types of economic 
regulations, where once again a high level of deference is the order of the 
day under modern constitutional law. Thus, during the New Deal 
Revolution, the Supreme Court took it upon itself to approve of minimum 
wage laws,87 general prospective rent control laws,88 and in wartime, the 
Court in Yakus v. United States sustained a general system of prospective 
price controls put forward under loose guidelines that left a fair level of 
play in the joints.89 The key feature of these cases is that they were surely a 
species of economic regulation to which a highly deferential standard of 
review is applied. 
In dealing with the interchange issue, both courts erred in thinking that 
the rational basis standard applied. The challenge to the Durbin 
Amendment certainly does not involve a physical taking and thus looks as 
though it falls into either the Penn Central or the Yakus line of cases. But 
that analysis is incorrect under current law, for neither of these cases deals 
with the protection of financial interests in invested capital from forms of 
rate regulation. That law is provided by Armstrong v. United States,90 
which opted for a per se rule stating that disproportionate burdens should 
not be put on individuals who are asked to shoulder a larger share of the 
social burden in connection with some government venture.91 That case 
dealt with neither physical occupation of property nor land use regulation. 
Instead, the case involved the status of a materialman’s lien that Armstrong 
had placed on a U.S. Navy ship, a lien that promptly dissolved when the 
boat sailed out of Maine waters.92 Clearly, there was no reason Armstrong 
should have to bear a large fraction of the cost of repairing a U.S. vessel, 
so the case stands for the proposition that the United States can dissolve 
any lien that it chooses, so long as it remains prepared under the Takings 
Clause to be sued by the materialman whose actions it has converted into a 
general creditor.  
That financial context raised none of the issues that are relevant in land 
use planning, minimum wage, or price control cases. Indeed, the case bears 
the closest resemblance to the physical takings cases, precisely because the 
materialman could reduce his lien to possession of the property if the loan 
were not discharged. In essence, the case offers a per se rule that applies to 
financial claims against discrete physical assets.  
Armstrong also ushers in a discussion of the public utility rate 
regulation cases that supply the closest parallel to the situation here. The 
key point to note about these cases is that, like the materialman’s lien in 
                                                                                                                     
 87. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937). 
 88. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988).  
 89. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 422–23 (1944).  
 90. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 91. Id. at 48–49. 
 92. Id. at 41–42. 
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Armstrong, the protection that is provided under the rule only goes to 
previous investments in specific assets that are committed to some specific 
economic venture. The great concern is that once the assets are so 
committed, the government could restrict the price for which they could be 
sold, so that the original investor could not recover the initial fixed costs. 
Once that is done, there will not be any other investments in fixed assets of 
the sorts that are needed to run major public utilities. Accordingly, the 
constitutional protection afforded in those cases departs radically from the 
level of protection that is afforded either in the regulatory takings cases 
under Penn Central (in which the Supreme Court did not say a word about 
rate regulation) or the general economic regulation of the sort at issue in 
West Coast Hotel or Yakus. It is therefore no simple historical curiosity that 
the major modern case on utility regulation, Federal Power Commission v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co.,93 was decided in the same term as Yakus, yet came 
out exactly the opposite, affording some level of protection to assets that 
were invested into a business.94 
B.  Applying Rate Regulation to Competitive Industries with Sunk Costs 
The hallmarks of the public utility regulation cases were alluded to in 
Judge Piersol’s opinion,95 but without any understanding of the 
relationship between natural monopolies and competitive industries. 
Owing to technical limitations on the methods of protection, many services 
like electric, gas, and telecommunications are industries that require huge 
front-end costs to get off the ground, coupled with relatively low marginal 
costs for each additional unit of production over some relevant range. That 
high fixed-cost, low variable-cost structure makes these public utilities a 
natural monopoly—in the sense that, over the relevant range of demand, a 
single supplier within a given territory is able to satisfy the market more 
cheaply than any two suppliers. This condition holds because the marginal 
cost of adding new units of capacity are below the fixed cost of starting a 
second plant to compete with the first.96 To leave only one party in the 
marketplace, however, is to let it charge monopoly prices, which, under 
orthodox economic theory, results in social losses because the quantity of 
goods sold is restricted as the price charged increases. The theory of rate 
regulation is that for some limited administrative cost, the government can 
force the public utility to sell at something that approximates a competitive 
price, such that the social gains from expanded output are larger than the 
administrative costs expended to achieve it. That proposition can be, and 
                                                                                                                     
 93. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
 94. See id. at 601–05. 
 95. See TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45059, at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011). 
 96. For further discussion, see RICHARD A. POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS 
REGULATION 4–6 & n.6 (1999). 
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indeed has been, disputed.97 But for these purposes, there is no question 
that the government in these regulated industries cases has the power to 
regulate; the only question is how. 
The decision in Hope Natural Gas was not the first effort to develop a 
technique to deal with the rate regulation issue. The earlier Supreme Court 
decision, Smyth v. Ames,98 asked the reviewing courts first to decide those 
assets of the business that were used and useful in service to the public, 
and then to calculate an appropriate rate of return on those assets, taking 
into account the riskiness of the business. Under Smyth, the public utility 
bore the risk that some of its investments would be disqualified, without 
quite knowing which ones. In exchange, it received a higher rate of 
return.99 The decision in Hope Natural Gas was developed in reaction to 
the earlier test, and in it, Justice William O. Douglas iterated a different 
test, intended to be easier to administer. His alternative methodology 
simply determined the cash and other assets that were committed to the 
venture, after which it set a rate of return whose “end result” guaranteed a 
reasonable risk-adjusted return to the utility. The point of the system was to 
make sure that courts did not have to review each intermediate decision of 
the public utility, whose errors could easily cancel out. So long as the 
overall limitation was in place, nothing else mattered. It is critical to set out 
the main passage in Hope Natural Gas: 
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 
“just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the 
investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not 
insure that the business shall produce net revenues.” But such 
considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate 
concern with the financial integrity of the company whose 
rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point 
of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only 
for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the 
business. These include service on the debt and dividends on 
the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner 
should be commensurate with returns on investments in other 
enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, 
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial 
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to 
attract capital. The conditions under which more or less might 
be allowed are not important here. Nor is it important to this 
                                                                                                                     
 97. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (offering a 
skeptical view of the question). 
 98. 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
 99. Id. at 546–47. 
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case to determine the various permissible ways in which any 
rate base on which the return is computed might be arrived at. 
For we are of the view that the end result in this case cannot 
be condemned under the Act as unjust and unreasonable from 
the investor or company viewpoint.100 
This decision remains relevant today. Duquesne Light Co. v. 
Barasch,101 the last rate case considered by the Supreme Court, held that 
any ratemaking agency had the choice of whether to follow the Smyth or 
Hope standard, but could not, of course, simply disregard the question of 
whether the utility had received a protected rate of return for its invested 
assets.102 In applying the Hope standard, moreover, the subsequent case 
law has held that the state does not discharge its obligation by embarking 
on a regime of slow starvation that allows the regulated firm to stave off 
bankruptcy but not to get the protected rate of return.103  
Perhaps the most instructive of the subsequent cases is Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Engler.104 In that case, the Michigan Public Service 
Commission applied a methodology that allowed the telephone company to 
recover its costs under the so-called Total Service Long Run Incremental 
Cost (TSLRIC), which was defined as follows:  
Total service long run incremental costs means, given 
current service demand, including associated costs of every 
component necessary to provide the service, 1 of the 
                                                                                                                     
 100. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575, 590 
(1942)). 
 101. 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
 102. Id. at 308–10. 
 103. See, for example, Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which stated: 
At oral argument before the en banc court, counsel for the Commission indicated 
that the “end result” test did allow a court to set aside a rate order when the 
company would otherwise go bankrupt and the Commission had refused to take 
that into account. The source of this constricted standard is elusive, not to say 
invisible. Hope Natural Gas talks not of an interest in avoiding bankruptcy, but an 
interest in maintaining access to capital markets, the ability to pay dividends, and 
general financial integrity. While companies about to go bankrupt would certainly 
see such interests threatened, companies less imminently imperiled will sometimes 
be able to make that claim as well. Jersey Central alleges that it is such a company. 
The contention that no company that is not clearly headed for bankruptcy has a 
judicially enforceable right to have its financial status considered when its rates 
are determined must be rejected. 
Id. at 1180; see also Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1253–56 (Cal. 1989) (en 
banc). 
 104. 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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following: 
(i) The total forward-looking cost of a telecommunication 
service, relevant group of service, or basic network 
component, using current least cost technology that would be 
required if the provider had never offered the service. 
(ii) The total cost that the provider would incur if the 
provider were to initially offer the service, group of service, 
or basic network component.105 
The Sixth Circuit granted Michigan Bell’s request for a preliminary 
injunction on the ground that this formula did not allow the utility to 
recover its constitutionally guaranteed rate of return under the Hope test 
because it made no allowance for any positive rate of return at all.106 The 
difficulty with the TSLRIC standard is that it insists that, at each interval, 
the position of the utility be regulated as if it had just made the most 
efficient investment in state-of-the-art technology. In an industry in which 
there are high rates of technological advance, that standard means that, 
over the life of any particular investment, it is certain that the utility cannot 
recover its fixed costs, given the systematic exclusion of its front-end costs 
from the system. The methodology was so flawed that there was no reason 
to wait until the utility had lost its invested capital, and thus a preliminary 
injunction was granted even under the exacting standards of proving 
irreparable harm applicable under that standard.107 
The precedent here is clear. The appropriate strategy in the traditional 
rate regulation case requires a determination of the full rate base from 
which the appropriate rate of return is required. At this point, it is best to 
think of the traditional rate regulation case as an amalgam that incorporates 
various standards of constitutional review. The insistence on the proper 
“end result” is a hard line rule that resonates with the strict scrutiny test 
used in both the physical occupation and the lien cases—Loretto and 
Armstrong, respectively—because there are none of the neighborhood 
effects found in the Penn Central line of land use cases, or the large 
prospective schemes of regulation at issue in cases like West Coast Hotel, 
Pennell, and Yakus. Hence, the correct statement of the current legal 
position is that, so long as the state uses the correct end point, it has some 
discretion in the choice of methodologies used. But once it is clear that the 
methodology does not allow for the recovery of the invested capital, then 
the statute must fail. Nothing in the Penn Central, Pennell, or Yakus lines 
of cases interfere with this result. Indeed, not a single ratemaking case cites 
Penn Central, precisely because it deals with a different universe of legal 
problems. Nor do the words “rational basis” appear in the ratemaking 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 595 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.2102(ff)). 
 106. Id. at 594–95. 
 107. See supra note 22. 
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/1
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 1335 
 
cases, even though that is the standard explicitly embraced. 
The most critical question is how these public utility cases carry over to 
the current problem. At no point did either the District Court or Eighth 
Circuit address this question. Rather, they simply assumed—wrongly—that 
the absence of monopoly power eliminated the possibility of ratemaking 
abuse in the government, when the exact opposite is true. The monopoly 
firm has an excess cushion that gives it some protection against 
government abuse. The competitive firm has no such protection, for it is 
already at the competitive rate prior to the imposition of any system of rate 
regulation.  
At this point, it is critical to explore two key differences between the 
public utility with the natural monopoly and the debit card bank with no 
market power. One deals with industry structure and the other with the 
possibility of revenue recoupment from other sources. First, TCF and the 
other regulated banks operate in a competitive environment in which there 
are no territorial limitations either on their business or on the ability of new 
firms to enter their markets. Second, the standard regulated utility has only 
one source of income, its customer base, at which point it must be treated 
like a competitive firm, such that it has a fair chance to earn the 
appropriate rate of return on its assets from that single source. The 
situation for TCF and the other banks under the Durbin Amendment is 
different because they are explicitly allowed to recoup whatever revenue 
loss they suffer from the loss of interchange fees from their own customers, 
an opportunity that is not available to standard public utilities. 
The key question is how these two elements blend together, given that 
they cut in opposite directions. On the first point, the fact that the regulated 
banks are in a competitive market is a strong mark against the 
constitutionality of the legislation. Yet at the same time, the fact that there 
is pricing freedom between the bank and its customers cuts in exactly the 
opposite direction, supporting the constitutionality of the regulation. The 
key inquiry, therefore, is how to evaluate the combined effect of these two 
factors in shaping the market setting in which TCF seeks to enjoin the 
operation of the statute. In effect, the regulation in question imposes a real 
loss on the defendants which counts, this Article argues, as a taking of their 
property, for which the ability to recoup from customers counts as a form 
of just compensation.  
In dealing with these twin elements, it would be necessary to calculate 
the precise loss in net value to the regulated banks if the issue was whether 
some compensation should make good their shortfall. But in this case the 
government does not have the slightest interest in giving compensation, so 
it is no longer necessary that TCF show exactly how much it loses through 
the imposition of the regulation. So long as it can marshal evidence that it 
will come up short, even by a penny, then it is entitled to enjoin the 
regulation, just as a landowner whose property is worth exactly $100 can 
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resist a government takeover if it were prepared to pay only $99.99. In this 
case the calculations are not nearly so close, but in fact are likely to cause 
major financial dislocations even with the new and higher Federal Reserve 
Rate. The next section examines the two pieces of this puzzle in sequence. 
C.  The Dedicated Assets of Banks in Their Debit Card Systems Are 
Entitled to Full Constitutional Protection  
1.  The Relevance of the Public Utility Cases 
TCF and other banks have dedicated specific assets toward their debit 
card business. Sinking those costs in that business raises questions of what 
items are included in the rate base, but these are not unique questions. The 
Federal Reserve, when it runs its own check-clearing apparatus, charges 
merchants for the cost of clearing checks under the regulations that it has 
issued pursuant to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980,108 whose regulations are published under the heading 
“Policies: Principles for the Pricing of Federal Reserve Bank Services.”109 
The two main purposes of this system are to “encourage competition to 
ensure provision of these services at the lowest cost to society,” and to 
“ensure[] an adequate level of services nationwide.”110 
The key regulation reads as follows: 
Over the long run, fees shall be established on the basis of 
all direct and indirect costs actually incurred in providing the 
Federal Reserve services priced, including interest on items 
credited prior to actual collection, overhead, and an allocation 
of imputed costs which takes into account the taxes that 
would have been paid and the return on capital that would 
have been provided had the services been furnished by a 
private business firm, except that the pricing principles shall 
give due regard to competitive factors and the provision of an 
adequate level of such services nationwide.111 
The explicit emphasis on “all direct and indirect costs” and “the return 
on capital that would have been provided had the services been furnished 
by a private business firm” echo the Hope Natural Gas formula for 
defining the rate base and calculating the appropriate return needed. For 
banks covered by the Durbin Amendment, that rate base includes all the 
                                                                                                                     
 108. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, sec. 101–08, 94 Stat. 132, 132–41 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
 109. Policies: Principles for the Pricing of the Federal Reserve Bank Services, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/ 
pfs_principles.htm (last updated Nov. 20, 2008). 
 110. Id.  
 111. 12 U.S.C. § 248a(c)(3) (2006). 
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costs of installation, maintenance, and upgrade of the computer system, as 
well as the various expenses needed to operate the system. These expenses 
on both physical hardware and service are included in the rate base of any 
regulated public utility, and should also be included here. The fact that they 
are explicitly excluded, even under the broad reading that the Federal 
Reserve Board gives to incremental costs, indicates that there is a serious 
shortfall that must be taken into account. 
Both courts took the government’s position that none of these 
calculations matter because none of the banks regulated under the Durbin 
Amendment counted as public utilities.112 As noted above,113 the key case 
was Minnesota Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Minnesota 
Department of Public Welfare,114 where the District Court addressed a 
question that the Court of Appeals skirted, namely whether the plaintiff 
nursing homes could challenge the adequacy of rates that they had 
voluntarily accepted.115 The simple and correct way to turn aside that 
challenge was to note that contracts with the government are no different 
from those with private parties, such that a person could not turn around 
and demand compensation on a losing contract. But rather than follow that 
sufficient regime, the court held that the public utilities cases were not 
relevant at all: 
Cases concerning public utilities are inapposite, however, 
because the present case simply does not involve a forced 
taking of property by the state. Minnesota nursing homes, 
unlike public utilities, have freedom to decide whether to 
remain in business and thus subject themselves voluntarily to 
the limits imposed by Minnesota on the return they obtain 
from investment of their assets in nursing home operation.116 
In addition, the two courts took the further position that the public 
utility cases are inapposite because the banks under the Durbin 
Amendment are entitled to withdraw from the industry altogether, and are 
thus not in the position of a public utility that is,117 according to Duquesne 
Light, required to serve its customers.118 The problem with this argument, 
if it is correct, is that it sidesteps the issue of whether any compensation is 
owed, by making the prior claim that this exhaustive scheme of regulation 
does not trigger any investigation under the Takings Clause. The 
                                                                                                                     
 112. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, 
at *12–13 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).  
 113. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 114. 742 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 115. Id. at 446.  
 116. Id. 
 117. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *12–13. 
 118. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989). 
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government then bolstered this position by examining the particular 
clauses in the TCF contracts. Claiming that TCF’s indefinite contractual 
terms similarly precluded a Takings Clause claim on the ground that TCF 
did not have any “protectable” interest under the Takings Clause, the 
government pointed to Visa’s Core Principles, which allows Visa to alter 
its rates under the following contractual provision: 
Interchange is consistently monitored and adjusted—
sometimes increased and sometimes decreased—in order to 
ensure that the economics present a competitive value 
proposition for all parties. Interchange reimbursement fees 
must encourage card holding and use, as well as expansion 
in the number and types of businesses that accept cards. If 
rates are too high, retailers won’t accept cards; if rates are 
too low, issuers won’t issue cards. Visa may establish 
different interchange reimbursement fees in order to 
promote a variety of system objectives, such as enhancing 
the value proposition for Visa products, providing 
incentives to grow merchant acceptance and usage, and 
reinforcing strong system security and transaction 
authorization practices.119 
2.  The Relevance of a Protectable Interest 
It is just a category mistake to assume, as both courts inaccurately did, 
that the principles of rate regulation do not apply solely because banks 
operate in a competitive industry. The basic problem that these banks face 
remains the same as it was for public utilities: without constitutional 
protection of future returns, they could not sink investments today. The 
constitutional return thus sparks the initial investment. Banks have that 
problem even if they operate in a competitive industry, with only this 
difference: in these cases, there normally is no need for rate regulation to 
insure that firms in a competitive industry charge a competitive rate; that is 
what they will do in any event. Indeed, it is precisely because they are at a 
competitive rate that any system of rate regulation that fails to guarantee 
compensation will deprive them of their constitutional right to a 
competitive rate of return, i.e., a rate that allows them to attract and retain 
capital. Put otherwise, there is less justification for regulating a competitive 
firm than there is for regulating a public utility because the competitive 
firm has no monopoly power, when, contrary to Judge Piersol’s 
observation, it is that element of monopoly power that justifies state 
                                                                                                                     
 119. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010), 
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulations-
core.pdf. 
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regulation of standard public utilities.120 In other words, all rate regulation 
of competitive firms is unconstitutional unless there is some offsetting 
advantage. 
In its brief, the Government argues that the key difference is that firms 
in competitive industries are not “obligated” to stay in that industry, which 
is not the case for public utilities required to serve the public.121 As stated 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, “As public utilities, both Duquesne and 
[copetitioner] Penn Power are under a state statutory duty to serve the 
public.”122 But the point is wrong on every count. First, the traditional 
definition of a public utility referred to a company that was the sole 
supplier in a given territory. It was only required to serve the public so long 
as it remained in business, which meant that, as the sole supplier of an 
essential service, it could not refuse to serve customers within its service 
area. The “required” element was universal service, not a duty to remain in 
business. Historically, public utilities were always allowed to withdraw 
from a given market, so long as they gave notice of their intention, which 
allowed for an orderly transition.123 The modern position, which requires 
certain public utilities to get government approval to withdraw from the 
market, is a departure from the traditional rule. The distinction concerning 
withdrawal rights, moreover, is quite irrelevant to the issue at hand, which 
is whether a government maneuver on rates is constitutional, even when it 
makes it impossible for the firm to recoup its investment with a reasonable 
rate of return over the expected life of the project.  
Consider first the variation where the established firm is not allowed to 
withdraw from the market. In these circumstances, the government is 
surely right to concede the risk of expropriation, for without constitutional 
rate protection, the firm could be forced to provide services for trifling 
sums that do not even cover its variable costs, which could result in losses 
                                                                                                                     
 120. TCF I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, at *13. 
 121. Brief for Government, supra note 49, at 30–32. 
 122. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 307. 
 123. See, e.g., H.W. Chaplin, Limitations Upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public 
Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555, 555 (1903). The relevant passage reads as follows: 
It is undoubtedly true—and allusion is made to it in the opinion in Munn v. 
Illinois—that where a public right in property or to service arises from a voluntary 
holding out of the property or the service to the public, it may ordinarily be 
terminated by a withdrawal of the offer of public use. . . .  
This rule is, however, obviously subject to the qualification that one cannot 
abruptly, and without reasonable opportunity to the public to change their own 
affairs accordingly, so terminate his relations with the public. For example, an 
innkeeper could not lawfully put a sudden end to his business in the middle of a 
winter night, nor a common carrier suddenly leave his occupation and abandon his 
passengers or freight by the roadside . . . .  
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)). 
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of not only its front-end fixed costs, but all variable costs as well. 
Alternatively, suppose that the right to withdraw is given absolutely. 
The modern public utility is a far different creature than the horse and 
buggy that had a franchise on the road from London to Oxford. Once that 
team is withdrawn from public service, it has alternative private uses that 
effectively negate the risk that its owner will not be able to recover the cost 
of capital. Indeed, in these cases the risk of abuse from withdrawal lies 
with the franchise holder, not the government, which is why the notice 
requirement is imposed. But with modern public utilities that have capital 
in the ground, the utility would withdraw from doing business only if it 
could not recover its variable costs. If it could recover all of its variable 
costs, it would remain in business even if it could not recover all of its 
fixed costs plus a reasonable rate of return during the useful life of the 
asset. The risk of expropriation without falling into bankruptcy thus 
remains whether or not withdrawal is allowed. All that the exit right does 
is reduce the size of the potential expropriation. It does not eliminate it. 
That exact same risk of expropriation faces the competitive firm that 
has made fixed investments in a given line of business. Once those 
investments are made, that firm is as vulnerable to government action as 
the firm that has the utility. A system of price controls that is keyed to 
variable (or incremental) costs, like the Durbin Amendment, does not 
afford the competitive firm any more opportunity to recover its fixed costs 
than the public utility, which is why it is entitled to constitutional 
protection against expropriation. That point, moreover, is explicitly 
recognized in the cases. The provision of automobile insurance, for 
example, is supplied in competitive industries from which individual 
insurers have a right to withdraw. Yet it is beyond doubt that the state 
cannot justify confiscatory rates by pointing to the ability of the firm to 
withdraw from the market at the cost of losing its fixed investment. Thus, 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance,124 cited in 
TCF’s appellate brief125 but ignored by the court, put the point as follows: 
The Commonwealth’s admitted power to regulate the 
insurance business and the rates which are charged for 
insurance does not permit it to limit the conduct of such 
business to those companies which submit to whatever rates 
the Commonwealth may fix, even if they be confiscatory. The 
writing of insurance is a lawful business and the 
Commonwealth may not impose unconstitutional conditions 
upon the exercise of the right to engage therein. While it is 
not constitutionally required to fix rates which will guarantee 
                                                                                                                     
 124. 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970). 
 125. Brief of Appellant TCF National Bank at 31, TCF National Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 
1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011) (No. 11-1805), 2011 WL 1849198. 
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/1
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARADOX OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 1341 
 
a profit to all insurers, it may not constitutionally fix rates 
which are so low that if the insurers engage in business they 
may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required to 
either submit to confiscatory rates or go out of business. They 
have a right to rates which are not confiscatory, or which 
satisfy any higher applicable statutory standards; and to a 
judicial review on the constitutional or statutory adequacy of 
such rates.126 
It follows, therefore, that none of the regulated banks forfeit the 
constitutional challenge simply because they operate in a competitive 
market from which they have a right to leave if they so choose. The 
situation does not differ on the ground that none of the regulated banks 
have a so-called protected interest in their customer. That same point can 
be made with respect to all public utilities, whose customers are not bound 
to take their services at the stipulated rate. Public utilities receive their 
protection because of their interest in a rate structure that allows them, 
assuming the rational behavior of their customers, the opportunity to earn a 
constitutional rate of return. That situation does not change because the 
supposed vulnerability of the regulated banks comes from the core terms of 
the Visa contract (for which there is, of course, a close analogue for 
MasterCard127). The key point here is that any party that enters into a good 
faith arrangement takes at least some risk that the price fluctuations would 
be less than they hoped for. But those risks are offset by the possibility of 
price shifts in the opposite direction. In the case of the instant debit card 
contracts, there is a long history of acquired practice that signals a high 
level of stability in these arrangements between the parties. The one risk 
the banks did not assume was that some third party would use brute force 
to upset their private arrangements with the network platforms. When the 
deliberate actions of third persons disrupt these ongoing arrangements, 
both parties can sue the intervener for interference with prospective 
advantage. The power of the government to undertake actions that disrupt 
these relationships, but only if they are prepared to pay compensation for 
the losses that they engage, is exactly why confiscatory rates are enjoined: 
at no point has the federal government indicated a willingness to pay for 
the losses that it has inflicted. It follows, therefore, that the issue of 
protectable interest does not help the Government’s case at all. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 N.E.2d at 703 (citations omitted). 
 127. See MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL INTERCHANGE RATES (2011), 
available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/MasterCard_Interchange_Rates_and 
_Criteria.pdf.  
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3.  The Role of Good Faith Contracting 
Even if some protectable interest was required, these contracts supply 
it. As a matter of straight contract law, Judge Piersol was wrong when he 
said that the provisions in the Visa/TCF contract allowed Visa 
“unmitigated” discretion to set whatever rates it chose.128 The parties to the 
contract never conceived of their relationship in that manner during the 
long period during which it has been in place, and the law in these cases 
always circumscribes the power that the dominant party—here the rate-
setter—has by imposing on it a duty to act in good faith, which essentially 
requires it to take steps that allow all parties to the deal to achieve a 
reasonable rate of return over the life of the contract. 
To see why, it is critical to read the key provisions of the Visa/TCF 
contract in light of the problem that they seek to address. It is not possible 
to determine at the outset a fixed set of rates for the life of a contract, given 
the unexpected fluctuations that could be necessitated by shifts in supply 
and demand, changes in technology, or alterations in the regulatory 
environment. Yet at the same time Visa understands that, in order for this 
network to persist, each party to the transaction has to receive a net benefit 
from its continued participation in it. Accordingly, Visa pledges to keep 
rates within a range that induces all participants to remain inside the 
system by promising to provide net benefits to all participants.129 It is, of 
course, the case that Visa cannot allow itself to be sued by either merchants 
or banks for each rate fluctuation, but it surely pledges to operate in good 
faith to achieve the desired goal. Good faith obligations of this sort are 
commonplace in the world of common law adjudication. 
Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon130 that long-term arrangements are “instinct with an obligation,” 
which requires one contracting party to afford the other the opportunity to 
recover its costs plus a reasonable return on their labor or capital.131 In 
Wood, Judge Cardozo held that the defendant fashion-designer, who had 
given an exclusive license to the plaintiff marketer to promote her goods, 
could not terminate the arrangement at will on the blithe assumption that 
the plaintiff was not bound to do anything at all. Cardozo wrote:  
The agreement of employment is signed by both parties. It 
has a wealth of recitals. The defendant insists, however, that it 
lacks the elements of a contract. She says that the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                     
 128. TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke (TCF I), No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45059, 
at *14 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011), aff’d, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. June 29, 2011).  
 129. VISA, VISA INTERNATIONAL OPERATING REGULATIONS: CORE PRINCIPLES 10 (2010), 
available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operating-regulations-
core.pdf. 
 130. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 131. Id. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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does not bind himself to anything. It is true that he does not 
promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts 
to place the defendant’s indorsements and market her designs. 
We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be 
implied. The law has outgrown its primitive stage of 
formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, 
and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A 
promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 
“instinct with an obligation,” imperfectly expressed. If that is 
so, there is a contract.132  
Earlier, in Moran v. Standard Oil Co. of New York,133 Judge Cardozo 
used that same phase—“instinct with an obligation”134—to prevent an 
employer from terminating a five-year employment agreement before the 
plaintiff had a chance to recover his costs by earning commissions: “An 
intention to make so one-sided an agreement is not to be readily 
inferred.”135 Judge Richard A. Posner has recently expressed that same 
sentiment in Market Street Associates v. Frey.136 Thus, it is common to 
read in “the implied condition that an exclusive dealer will use his best 
efforts to promote the supplier’s goods, since otherwise the exclusive 
feature of the dealership contract would place the supplier at the dealer’s 
mercy.”137 Similar principles have also been incorporated into the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s rules on output and requirements contracts.138 
Visa has made just that sort of commitment in the debit interchange 
market. Therefore, it could not reduce the rates it pays to zero just because 
it decided to do so. At the very least, the bank would have the right to 
withdraw for a material breach of contract, and in cases of manifest bad 
faith, the bank could probably sue to recover its lost profits from the earlier 
arrangement. There are, of course, no suits of this sort involving debit card 
interchange because Visa and MasterCard, conscious of the importance of 
their reputation and customer good will, would not take irrational steps that 
would squander these painfully-acquired advantages. It is, therefore, 
wholly wrong to think that there is no protectable interest under these 
contracts, even if such were required to make out a takings case. 
Nor is it necessary that each of Visa’s customers make a gain on each 
transaction. As with ratemaking generally, the key issue is whether the 
entire relationship generates a profit, not whether each element of an 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914). 
 134. Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 135. Id. at 220. 
 136. See 941 F.2d 588, 595–96 (7th Cir. 1991).  
 137. Id. at 596 (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917)). 
 138. U.C.C. § 2-306 (2004) (noting that the quantity term in both output and requirements 
contracts is governed by principles of good faith). 
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extended package purports to do so. That rule works, moreover, to the long 
term advantage of all of the individual franchisees of a common vendor, 
who otherwise could not coordinate their promotional activities. Thus, the 
close affinity between good faith contract principles and generalized 
ratemaking principles is found in many cases that deal with disputes 
between franchisors and franchisees, as well.  
One good example of how this process works is found in National 
Franchisee Ass’n v. Burger King Corp.139 Burger King required its 
franchisees to carry a $1.00 Value Meal item, which it had to sell at a 
loss.140 The court held that Burger King did not act in bad faith because it 
made the decision to include the Value Meal “with the honest belief that 
the measure it is adopting will help the company meet competition and 
succeed in the marketplace.”141 So long as Burger King’s overall set of 
prices allowed its franchisees to recover their cost and make a reasonable 
profit, they could not complain about having to bear their fair share of the 
promotional costs. At this point, the uniform standards Burger King sets 
for its franchisees are an effort to stop a prisoner’s dilemma game among 
franchisees, where each wants to free-ride on the promotion efforts of other 
franchisees. Indeed, to allow individual franchisees to opt out of the 
promotional events would undermine the principle of equal treatment for 
all franchises and allow the unilateral actions of some to undermine the 
collective good of all. The duty of good faith, therefore, does not require 
the impossible of franchisees, but rather, makes perfectly good sense in the 
way that the Durbin Amendment does not: it allows for the coordination of 
multiple franchisees in ways that advance their common interest.  
In the end, therefore, we can say that there are two clear rights that 
inhere to TCF and other banks in these arrangements. First, if Visa set its 
rates so as to deprive the banks of their contract rights, they could 
withdraw from the arrangement even though it is for a specified term. 
Second, and more critically, TCF could sue Visa for damages arising from 
a breach of that arrangement in the same way that Wood could sue Lady 
Duff Gordon for her decision to withdraw unilaterally from the deal. Good 
faith contracts are not idle. If there were some need for a protectable 
interest, these contracts, which do supply meaningful business protection, 
offer that interest. The reason why there is so little litigation on this point is 
that no one ever takes the steps that both courts wrongly supposed Visa 
was allowed. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 139. No. 09-23435-CIV, 2010 WL 4811912 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010). 
 140. Id. at *1.  
 141. Id. at *3. 
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4.  Just Compensation 
The last piece of the puzzle is whether the constitutional test for just 
compensation is satisfied. In dealing with this issue generally, 
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States142 sets out the standard that, 
“in view of the combination of those two words [—just and 
compensation—there can] be no doubt that the compensation must be a 
full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.”143 In land cases, this 
translates into the fair market value of the land. In cases of ratemaking, 
with the constitutional obligation to meet the end result, the test is the 
same: is the financial position in which a firm is placed one that allows it 
to attract and retain capital sufficient to earn a competitive rate of return?  
In approaching this question, the first issue is whether TCF operates in 
a competitive market. Both courts assumed that it did, even though huge 
portions of the debate over the Durbin Amendment questioned whether 
this was true. As noted above, the correct answer is that the market is as 
competitive as it can get. Once that assumption is made, it is now possible 
to recast the general test for just compensation in this form: did the 
government regulation allow the regulated banks the same rate of return on 
their debit card investments as they had before the statute was put into 
place? The mere fact that these lawsuits were brought is evidence enough 
that the possibility of offsets in the form of higher fees against debit card 
customers is not sufficient to produce that result. Why would anyone sue if 
their options for mitigation were perfect? It is far more rational to go on 
with business, substituting a new income stream whose net present 
discounted value was equal to the one that was displaced.  
It is also possible to identify a number of reasons why the net position 
after regulation could not equal the rate before regulation. In dealing with 
this issue it is necessary to consider two different scenarios about how the 
Durbin Amendment will be administered. Under the first, it is assumed that 
all banks will be subject to the same rate restrictions as the large banks, 
notwithstanding the exemption for banks with less than $10 billion in 
assets. Under the second, it is assumed that the smaller banks are able to 
collect their higher interchange fees, and thus not raise costs to their own 
customers.  
Under the first scenario, there is no question that if these regulations 
were imposed on banks before they started their debit card business, they 
would be a prospective form of regulation that is immune from challenge 
under the rational basis test. But, as noted above, they were not. Instead, 
they were imposed after the current system was put into place by voluntary 
transactions. At this point, the movement to the new system is necessarily 
inefficient because it removes the use of cross-payments which increase the 
                                                                                                                     
 142. 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 
 143. Id. at 326. 
39
Epstein: The Constitutional Paradox of the Durbin Amendment: How Monopolie
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
1346 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
efficiency of a two-sided market. Quite simply, any system that prohibits 
those cross-payments is necessarily less efficient than one that allows 
them. The shrinkage in the pie therefore means that some party has been 
hurt. It is not the retailers, so the loss has to be borne by the other parties to 
the transaction. Detailed empirical work is needed to show the exact 
magnitude and incidence of this loss, but even if it cannot be measured, it 
is perfectly certain that the regulated banks have suffered some portion of 
it. Therefore, if the above analysis of rate regulation is correct, the banks 
are entitled to compensation for these losses. Note that in this form, there is 
complete evidence of irreparable harm to the banks, for even if they can 
mitigate the loss to a greater or lesser extent, that mitigation never restores 
them to the position they had before the regulation was imposed. Since no 
compensation is offered for that unmeasured loss, the act has to be 
enjoined. Indeed the situation is even clearer that full compensation is not 
provided, for it is evident that there is an additional loss to consumers, who 
will have to pay more in direct fees to their banks than they paid under the 
prior interchange system for the same services. Throw in the high 
administrative costs of running this system, and it is clear that a deviation 
from the competitive equilibrium necessarily occurs. The compensation 
offset falls short in all cases, and therefore cannot supply just 
compensation. 
The second permutation requires the assumption that there is some 
monopoly power at play. Ironically, on this issue everyone was arguing the 
wrong side of the case. The experts for TCF should have insisted that they 
had monopoly power so as to get a competitive rate of return. The 
government should have insisted that the industry was perfectly 
competitive, even if it meant repudiating everything that Senator Durbin 
said to the contrary. That weird role reversal, of course, should never be 
expected: it is only in the judicial wonderland of these two opinions that 
being in a monopoly position becomes a key asset to the regulated firm.  
On the usual assumption that monopoly power offers a reason to 
regulate, the case is far thinner here than in the standard public utility that 
operates a relatively static technology in an exclusive territory with a 
captive customer base. The debit interchange system is marked by the lack 
of territorial exclusivity, and the constant innovation of new technologies 
means that the residual level of monopoly profit must be small. As such, 
the regulation has to be modest lest it cut below the guaranteed rate of a 
competitive return. In this case, we know that the results cannot come 
close. In addition to all the imperfections noted above, the system of rate 
regulation under the Durbin Amendment does not even attempt to estimate 
the appropriate rate base due to its systematic truncation. It is irrelevant 
whether the Federal Reserve gave a more generous set of rates to the 
banking industry the second time round. Rather, the question is whether it 
tried to set those rates in a way that guaranteed the competitive rate of 
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return on capital, to which the answer is an emphatic no. Again, there is no 
real debate about this point, which simply disappears from view at every 
stage of the proceeding: there was no effort to build up the correct rate 
base, to determine the extent of monopoly power, to look at risk-related 
returns, or anything else. The case, therefore, does not come within a 
country mile of meeting any of the many formulations for rate base 
determination set out above. 
Thus, wholly apart from any reference to the $10 billion asset 
exemption, the Durbin Amendment is dead on arrival under any sensible 
rate regulation analysis that does not limit coverage only to monopoly 
industries. Once that new fact comes in, it only strengthens the conclusion. 
If the small banks continue to get their exemption, there is little question 
that the big banks will be at a huge competitive advantage. As Anne 
Layne-Farrar noted in her TCF report, the customer base of banks like TCF 
is fragile to begin with, as over 20% of their accounts open and close each 
year. A rough estimate of $100 in additional bank fees, whether by swipe 
or by month, will induce low income customers to close their accounts, 
which could lead to an erosion of the rate base.144 The current system of 
charges does not require a big supplement, but again, that point hardly 
matters. So long as we know that the Durbin Amendment would supply 
insufficient protection without the $10 billion asset exemption, this is an a 
fortiori case against its constitutionality, even if it assumed that the equal 
protection challenge dies a quick death under the rational basis test.  
CONCLUSION 
The decisions in the TCF case offer powerful insights into the 
intellectual complacency that dominates judicial decisionmaking in takings 
cases today. It simply defies comprehension to think that a firm gets more 
constitutional protection when it has monopoly power than when it 
operates in a competitive industry. Outside the peculiar context of this 
case, no one has ever thought that competitive firms should be more 
vulnerable to government expropriation than monopoly firms. Yet that 
explicit mistaken assumption drove this case, leading to an erroneous 
analysis of every relevant question pertaining to rate-of-return regulation.  
The short and simple statement of this case is that the strong rate 
regulation of the Durbin Amendment must leave the regulated firms with 
the same competitive rate of return with which they started. In this 
instance, the regulation leaves them below that level. Moreover, the option 
to charge customers does not restore the firms to the competitive rate of 
return they previously enjoyed. Surely a taking without just compensation 
should be enjoined. Perhaps someday the Supreme Court will repair the 
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intellectual damage to the Takings Clause that the Eighth Circuit inflicted 
in TCF National Bank v. Bernanke.  
42
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 6 [2011], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss6/1
